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Abstract
 
The paper empirically analyzes the impact of the degree of efficiency on key performance fig-
ures of publicly traded European banks in the period from 2005 to 2009. Efficiency is meas-
ured by constructing non-parametric frontiers using the technique of data envelopment analysis 
on the cost, revenue, and profit sides. Decomposition of overall efficiency provides a detailed 
insight into effective risk and performance drivers in the banking industry. The results of our 
paper suggest that an increase in pure technical efficiency is related to more volatile assets, 
which is reflected in lower market values. Allocative and scale efficiency, however, boost capi-
tal market performance. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The financial crisis of 2008 substantiated the crucial role of banking stability for the econ-
omy. Globalization and increased competition drive higher efficiency in the financial indus-
try. Despite of all improvements, efficiency progress, and strict regulations, a stable risk-
return position of banks can unexpected easily be impaired. This fact motivated empirical 
work in recent years to assess performance and risk indicators in the banking industry. 
 
The first group of studies (Short (1979), Bourke (1989), Molyneux/Thornton (1992), Bik-
ker/Hu (2002), and Athanasoglou/Brissimis/Delis (2008)) analyzes the impact of bank-
specific (capital, liquidity, and assets), industry-specific (market share, concentration, and 
economies of scale) and macroeconomic (inflation, business cycle, and money supply) deter-
minants of bank profitability. Another group of papers concentrates on the relation between 
activity diversification, market valuation, and risk level of banks (Stiroh/Rumble (2006), 
Laeven/Levine (2007), and Elsas/Hackethal/Holzhäuser (2010)). Another important direction 
of empirical investigations concerns the influence of ownership structure, ownership concen-
tration, and board structure on profitability, valuation, and risk-taking behaviour of financial 
institutions (Iannotta/Nocera/Sironi (2007), Caprio/Laeven/Levine (2007), Laeven/Levine 
(2009), Pathan (2009), and Barry/Lepetit/Tarazi (2011)). 
 
A new aspect of research is dedicated to efficiency measurement and its influence on per-
formance of banks. Empirical investigations use two main methodologies to estimate effi-
ciency of banks: Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA) and Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). 
The study of Beccalli/Casu/Girardone (2006) is linked to the relevance of cost efficiency for 
stock performance of European listed banks. They find that stocks of efficient banks tend to 
outperform inefficient financial institutions, since changes in efficiency are reflected in stock 
prices. Applying both DEA and SFA for efficiency estimation, the analysis shows higher ex-
planatory power of DEA-based efficiency scores compared to SFA-based scores. Besides, the 
authors find irrelevance of the cost to income ratio, as a traditional proxy for cost efficiency, 
in explaining stock prices. 
 
The studies of Fiordelisi (2007), Fiordelisi/Molyneux (2010a), and Fiordelisi/Molyneux 
(2010b) show a positive impact of efficiency on value creation in European banks, where 
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value is created in case that operating earnings exceed cost of invested capital. Fiorde-
lisi/Molyneux (2010a) estimate positive influence of cost, revenue, profit and shareholder 
efficiency on shareholder value of listed and unlisted banks. Shareholder efficiency was in-
troduced by Fiordelisi (2007). It indicates the ability to produce the maximum possible share-
holder value with a certain quantity of inputs and outputs. Compared to cost and profit effi-
ciency, shareholder efficiency shows higher explanatory power for economic value added 
(EVA). Fiordelisi/Molyneux (2010a) concentrate not only on efficiency parameters, but also 
simultaneously investigate bank-specific, industry-specific and macroeconomic determinants 
of value creation. 
 
Assessing shareholder value creation, EVA is divided into two main components, i.e. eco-
nomic profit and cost of capital, in order to identify the form of efficiency influence on EVA. 
The results show that revenue efficiency increases economic profit, whereas cost efficiency 
reduces cost of capital. Using DEA, Fiordelisi/Molyneux (2010b) decompose cost efficiency 
and total factor productivity into their main components. Focusing on several European coun-
tries, the authors analyze whether efficiency components are relevant for shareholder value. 
Their results show that all components possess power in explaining bank performance. How-
ever, total factor productivity exhibits the highest information content among all assessed fac-
tors. 
 
The studies of Berger/DeYoung (1997), Kwan/Eisenbeis (1997), Altunbas et al. (2007), Kout-
somanoli-Filippaki/Mamatzakis (2009), and Fiordelisi/Marques-Ibanez/Molyneux (2011) 
examine the link between efficiency and risk-taking behavior of banks. The first three men-
tioned studies assess the relation between efficiency and asset quality of banks estimated by 
problem loans (Berger/DeYoung (1997)), past-due and non-accrual loans (Kwan/Eisenbeis 
(1997)), and loan-loss reserves (Altunbas et al. (2007)). Berger/DeYoung (1997) find inverse 
Granger-causality between cost efficiency and non-performing loans. However, among highly 
efficient banks, an increase in cost efficiency tends to be followed by an increase in non-
performing loans, indicating a short-term operating cost reduction at the expense of long-run 
loan quality. Kwan/Eisenbeis (1997) confirm a positive relation between inefficiency and 
risk, taking into account not only credit risk but also interest risk. The results of Altunbas et 
al. (2007) show that only least efficient banks take less risk with decreasing cost efficiency. 
Their efficient counterparts appear to take more risk. The empirical work of Koutsomanoli-
Filippaki/Mamatzakis (2009) and Fiordelisi/Marques-Ibanez/Molyneux (2011) assesses influ-
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ence of efficiency on bank default risk measured by Merton’s (1974) model.1 This forward-
looking measure reflects market information in terms of stock prices, volatility, and leverage 
(Koutsomanoli-Filippaki/Mamatzakis (2009)). The last-mentioned studies find an inverse 
relation between efficiency and default risk of banks. 
 
Most studies focus, however, on influences of cost, revenue and profit efficiency. Decompos-
ing these efficiencies in their components allows a detailed analysis of value and risk drivers in 
the banking industry. However, this approach is rare in empirical literature. Therefore in our 
paper, a detailed insight of efficiency impact on risk and performance of European commercial 
banks is presented. Efficiency is measured by constructing non-parametric frontiers using DEA 
on the cost, revenue and profit sides. In this framework, we measure overall, allocative, techni-
cal, pure technical and scale efficiency. In contrast to most previous studies, we apply both 
production and intermediation models to determine efficiency. We assess efficiency scores 
obtained by these models and compare their influence on performance and risk of banks. 
 
Additionally, the Malmquist index and its components are computed to provide a clearer pic-
ture of the basic sources of productivity change over time. To guarantee the quality of our 
analysis, the required financial data is mostly hand-collected directly from the banks’ financial 
statements. To eliminate differences in accounting standards, annual financial statements re-
ported under IFRS were considered. Applying several market-oriented and accounting-based 
performance and risk measures increases the likelihood to capture important influencing fac-
tors. 
 
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. At first, production and intermediation 
approaches of efficiency determination are compared in explaining return-risk positions of 
banks. Secondly, decomposition of efficiencies into their components shows how managers’ 
abilities are reflected in capital market performance of banks. Thirdly, not only popular share-
holder value creation based on accounting figures is considered, but also capital market value 
creation is assessed. Fourthly in the robustness check, we not only use loan loss provisions as a 
popular accounting-based risk measure, but also realized losses on loans in form of direct 
write-downs and/or utilization of corresponding provisions. Finally, hand-collected financial 
data guarantees the quality of accounting figures used for the analysis. 
 
1  Fiordelisi/Marques-Ibanez/Molyneux (2011) use expected default frequency (EDF) based on a commercial 
implementation of Merton’s model by Moody’s KMV. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes efficiency, risk and 
performance variables used in the study. Compiling all relevant input and output factors and 
their corresponding prices for efficiency estimation, the characteristics of the banking industry 
are presented. Data and summary statistics are described in Section 3. Empirical model specifi-
cations and regression results are provided in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Definition of Variables 
 
2.1 Efficiency and Productivity Change 
 
DEA is commonly used to analyze various notions of relative efficiency such as cost, revenue 
and profit efficiency of similar (homogenous) organizational units, so-called decision-making 
units (DMUs), in terms of utilization of inputs in generating outputs. The DEA approach is 
based on Farrell (1957) and on extensions of his work by Charnes/Cooper/Rhodes (1978) and 
Banker/Charnes/Cooper (1984), who introduced a non-parametric framework to measure and 
compare DMUs’ relative efficiency. Since then, DEA has developed in many directions and 
applications, as summarized by Emrouznejad/Parker/Tavares (2008) who cite almost four 
thousand publications. DEA is also widespread applied in the banking industry. Ber-
ger/Humphrey (1997) and Fethi/Pasiouras (2010) present a review of numerous studies, 
which assess bank performance with DEA techniques. 
 
DEA allows estimating cost, revenue and profit efficiency, total factor productivity changes, 
and their components. Decomposition of efficiency into components gives the opportunity for 
a detailed analysis of performance and risk drivers of banks. Cost efficiency reflects the man-
agers’ ability to minimize cost given a certain level of outputs. Cost efficiency is the product 
of technical and allocative efficiency, where technical efficiency comprises scale and pure 
technical efficiency. Technical efficiency evaluates the way of using inputs to produce a 
number of outputs. Pure technical efficiency determines technical efficiency exclusive scale 
effects (using variable returns to scale). It reflects the pure ability of managers to organize the 
optimal utilization of resources.2 
 
 
2  See Kumar/Gulati (2008). Figure 1 in Section 3 provides an overview of efficiency terms and efficiency 
components. 
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tudy. 
                                                
Scale efficiency measures the ability of managers to choose the optimum size of a bank to 
generate a certain production level. In case of decreasing returns to scale, a bank is too large 
to obtain advantages from scale. If a bank operates with increasing returns to scale, the size of 
the bank is too small for its scale of operations. Constant returns to scale indicate scale effi-
ciency of a bank.3 In case of cost efficiency, pure technical efficiency with input orientation 
reflects the ability to produce a given level of outputs with the minimum quantity of inputs. 
Here, scale efficiency describes the ability to choose the optimum input size. Allocative effi-
ciency reflects a cost-efficient mix of inputs given their prices. 
 
Revenue efficiency indicates whether a bank achieves the maximum level of revenue using a 
given quantity of inputs. Revenue efficiency also comprises technical efficiency and alloca-
tive efficiency  now with output orientation, where, again, technical efficiency is the prod-
uct of pure technical and scale efficiency. Here, pure technical efficiency mirrors the ability to 
produce the maximum level of outputs with a given quantity of inputs. The ability to choose 
the optimal output size is measured by scale efficiency, whereas the ability to manage the 
optimal production mix regarding its prices is reflected by allocative efficiency. Profit effi-
ciency considers both cost minimization and revenue maximization. 
 
The Malmquist productivity index measures total factor productivity changes over time. The 
Malmquist index can be decomposed into technological change, representing a shift in the 
efficient frontier, and technical efficiency change. The latter represents the product of pure 
technical efficiency change and scale efficiency change, which measure managerial effort and 
scale improvements between periods, respectively. 
 
In order to estimate efficiency, input and output factors of banks’ activities must be deter-
mined. Two popular models are specified in the literature to evaluate the banking industry: 
the production and the intermediation approach.4 Within the production model, banks are 
considered as operating units that use labor, capital, and other resources to provide their prod-
ucts and services. Therefore, number of employees and fixed assets are used as input factors. 
In contrast to production companies, fixed assets in banking are of minor importance. How-
ever, software plays an important role in banking. Thus, the value of fixed assets is extended 
by the value of software in our s
 
3  See loc.cit. 
4  See Asmild et al. (2004). 
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As invested capital, equity and securitized financial liabilities are taken into consideration. 
Equity is an important factor in banking, since, according to the Basel accords, equity limits 
the volume of risky activities of banks. Furthermore, securitized financial liabilities are con-
sidered as invested debt capital. With these input factors (resources) banks provide loans to 
the public, corporate customers, other banks etc. They invest in securitized financial assets 
and manage deposits of both banks and customers. Banks also offer services that are linked to 
the fee and commission income. Thus, loans, securitized financial assets, deposits, and net 
commission income are used as output factors in the production model. 
 
The intermediation approach treats banks as financial intermediaries, which collect their 
monetary funds from savers and investors and transpose these funds into further investments. 
In this approach, equity, securitized financial liabilities, and deposits characterize the input 
factors of banks. Outputs are loans, securitized financial assets, and net commission income. 
Thus, deposits are considered as output in the production model and as input in the interme-
diation model (see Table 1). According to Berger/Humphrey (1997), neither of these two ap-
proaches of efficiency determination is perfect, since both models do not fully capture the 
dual role of financial institutions as producing services and being financial intermediaries. 
Thus, we employ both models to compare the results regarding the respective influencing 
factors on banks’ performance and risk. 
 
In order to assess cost, revenue and profit efficiency, the prices of inputs and outputs are 
needed. The price for a unit of labor is calculated as total personnel expenses divided by the 
yearly average number of employees. The costs of fixed assets are computed as depreciations 
plus interest payments assuming debt-financed fixed assets. Here, the value of software and 
corresponding depreciations are also taken into account. The required return on equity deter-
mines the cost of equity and is estimated with the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). The 
prices for financial liabilities, financial assets, deposits, and loans are calculated by the ratio 
of the respective income or expense position over the value of the corresponding input or out-
put factor. The net commission price per unit is determined as net commission income over 
the yearly average number of employees (see, again, Table 1). 
 
  Production model Intermediation model 
Inputs
 Number of employees 
 Fixed assets 
 Equity 
 Financial liabilities 
 Equity 
 Financial liabilities 
 Deposits 
Outputs
 Loans 
 Financial assets 
 Deposits 
 Net commission income 
 Loans 
 Financial assets 
 Net commission income 
Prices
 Employees: 
employees ofNumber 
Expenses Personnel  
 Fixed assets: Depreciations Interest Rate Fixed assets
Fixed assets
   
 Equity: Required return of equity holders 
 Financial liabilities: Interest expenses on financial liabilities
Financial liabilities
 
 Loans: 
Loans
loanson  incomeInterest  
 Deposits: 
Deposits
depositson  expensesInterest  
 Financial assets: 
assetsFinancial
assets financialon  incomeInterest  
 Net commission income: 
employees ofNumber 
income commissionNet  
 
Table 1: Input and output factors of the production and the intermediation model 
 
2.2 Performance Measures 
 
Stock performance, Tobin’s q, market-to-book ratio, and shareholder value created are used to 
measure performance of banks in the following. We examine market-oriented as well as ac-
counting-based measures. Stock performance, measured by the average return ( R ) of a com-
pany’s stock, reflects market information. Tobin’s q and market-to-book ratio include both 
market and accounting data. Analyzing shareholder value created, we calculate accounting-
based residual income and additionally measure shareholder value added (Jensen’s alpha) 
using market information. 
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Brainard/Tobin (1968) introduced a basic macroeconomic concept of investment behavior. 
Investments are encouraged if the market value of invested capital is higher than its replace-
ment costs. In companies, replacement costs represent all costs that are needed to cover all 
items on the firm’s balance sheet. The ratio of market value to replacement costs (Tobin’s q) 
exceeds unity, if the internal rate of return of the investment is greater than cost of capital. 
This condition boosts the value and reflects the performance of the firm. A higher Tobin’s q 
can result from higher returns to scale or from investment risk reduction caused by a superior 
risk-return trade off.5 In order to measure Tobin’s q, replacement costs of assets are approxi-
mated with the book value of assets. The market value of assets is equal to the sum of equity 
market value and book value of total liabilities: 
 
(1) Market value of assets Market value of equity  Book value of liabilities
Replacement costs of assets Book value of assets
q    
 
Additionally, focusing on direct equity valuation, market value over book value of equity 
(M/B) is also used in the following. 
 
The aforementioned measures do not explicitly take cost of capital into consideration. Ac-
cording to the EVA model, value is created in a company only if operating earnings exceed 
cost of invested capital.6 Since managing deposits or selling debt instruments represent a core 
activity of a bank, interest expenses belong to operating expenses in banking. Due to this fi-
nancial institution specific, profits before interest expenses do not lead to economically mean-
ingful interpretations. Subtracting interest expenses from operating profits leads to an equity 
valuation framework. On this basis, equity-oriented EVA is determined as excess income over 
capital charges on equity (residual income (RI)): 
 
(2)  ,RI NI 1  t t E t tr B
 where  NI = Net income 
B = Book value of equity 
rE = Cost of equity (E) 
t = Year 2004,…,2009 
 
                                                 
5  See Tobin (1969 and 1978) and Tobin/Brainard (1977).  
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6  See Stewart (2008), p. 224. 
In order to avoid possible accounting distortions, adjustments concerning loan loss provisions 
and deferred taxes are made to net income and book value of equity in this study. These ad-
justments lead to adjusted residual incomes (RIadj).7 
 
Cost of equity can be estimated by the CAPM, where the expected return (E(Ri)) of security i 
depends on its level of systematic risk measured by the beta coefficient:8 
 
(3)  	E( ) E( ) 
  i f i M fR r R r  
 where  rf = Risk-free return 
   
i = Beta coefficient of security i 
   E(RM) = Expected return of the market portfolio 
 
The difference between expected return of the market portfolio and risk-free return equals the 
market risk premium. The beta coefficient represents the coefficient of a linear regression of 
excess security on excess market return. We estimated the long-run market risk premium 
based on the average return of the Euro Stoxx 50 minus the average one-month Euribor from 
1986 till 2006. The financial crisis time period is excluded from the market risk premium es-
timation, since capital markets then went down sharply resulting in a temporary negative risk 
premium. Beta coefficients (with respect to the Euro Stoxx 50) were taken from the 
Bankscope database for the year 2010 due to a stabilized stock price development during that 
year. Missing beta coefficients in the Bankscope database were self-calculated. Due to data 
limitations, we assume that our estimated beta coefficients are good proxies for systematic 
risk calculations. 
 
The estimated risk premium for every single bank (market risk premium multiplied by the 
bank’s beta coefficient) is assumed to stay constant. Though, the interest level, approximated 
by one-year Euribor, is taken into account to meet particularities in bank valuation. The inter-
est level changes cost of equity year by year: 
 
(4)  	,E( ) 1-Year Euribor E( )E t t i M fr R 
  r
                                                
 
 
 
7  Details are given in the appendix. 
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8  See Sharpe (1964). 
Value creation measured by EVA concentrates on accounting figures. Fernandez (2002) in-
troduced a market-oriented determination of shareholder value created. A company creates 
value if shareholder value added exceeds the required return on equity measured in market 
values.9 Shareholder value added is defined as an increase in wealth of shareholders during 
the given period. This increase is not only provided by a positive difference of market price of 
equity, but also by dividends and other payments to shareholders. Assuming that adjusted 
shares prices (Padj) reflect all capital yields and presenting created shareholder value in rela-
tive terms lead to: 
 
(5) 
adj adj
adj1
, ,adj adj
1 1
Shareholder value createdt t t
E t t E t
t t
P P r R r
P P

 

   
 as: 
                                                
 
 
The difference between rate of return and cost of equity, estimated by the CAPM, is known as 
Jensen’s alpha ().10 
 
2.3 Risk Measures 
 
Also in measuring risk of banks, both market-oriented (volatility and probability of default) 
and accounting-based (Z-score and loan loss provisions) measures are used. At first, we esti-
mate volatility of stock returns () based on monthly stock price data. After that, we concen-
trate on Z-score that measures distance to default. Here, we calculate different Z-scores using 
either accounting data or market prices. Subsequently, we describe probability of default 
based on Merton’s model. We additionally use loan loss provisions as banks’ internal credit 
risk estimations. 
 
The Z-score,11 as a popular risk measure associated with banks’ probability of failure, is 
widely spread in empirical banking literature.12 Defining insolvency as state in which losses 
(negative profits ) exceed equity (E < ), probability of default can be expressed
 
 
9  See Fernandez (2002), p. 9. 
10  See Jensen (1968). 
11  This measure should not be confused with the Z-score, developed by Altman (1968). Altman’s Z-score 
aggregates financial ratios of a linear discriminant function, which assesses bankruptcy potential of a com-
pany. 
 11
12  See, e.g., Bannier/Behr/Güttler (2010), Barry/Lepetit/Tarazi (2011), Boyd/Graham/Hewitt (1993), 
Foos/Norden/Weber (2010), Houston et al. (2010), Laeven/Levine (2009), and Lepetit et al. (2008). 
(6) Pr ob( ) Prob Prob ROA            
  
E EE
A A A



 
 
where A and ROA denote assets and return on assets, respectively. Assuming normally dis-
tributed returns on assets, probability of default reads as follows:13 
 
(7) Prob ROA N( )     
 
E z
A
 
where  z = 
ROA
ROA


E
A  
  N(.) = Standard normal distribution 
 
The Z-score specifies the number of standard deviations of return on assets below its expected 
value so that equity is just absorbed, resulting in bankruptcy of the bank.14 Z-score, as a 
measure of distance to default, shows a higher value in case of a lower probability of default. 
We calculate Z-scores using accounting data for net income, equity, and value of assets. In 
order to estimate mean and standard deviation of return on assets (ROA and ROA), we use the 
time period from 2004 till 2009. Following Laeven/Levine (2009) due to high skewness of the 
Z-score, a log-transformed Z-score is used for the regressions in Section 3. 
 
Additionally, we determine market-oriented Z-scores (zM) following Boyd/Graham/Hewitt 
(1993) and Ianotta/Nocera/Sironi (2007). Here, mean and standard deviation of return on as-
sets are estimated based on monthly stock price data. The market-oriented return on assets 
(ROAM) is computed as market profit over value of assets per share: 
 
(8) 
adj adj
M 1
adj
ROA t tt
t
t
t
P P
DP
n


 
 
where D denotes book value of liabilities and n is the number of shares outstanding. The mar-
ket equity-to-assets ratio  additionally needed to compute zM according to formula (7)  is 
computed as follows: 
                                                 
13  See Boyd/Graham/Hewitt (1993). 
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14  See Boyd/Graham (1988), Boyd/Graham/Hewitt (1993), and Hannan/Hanweck (1988). 
 (9) 
M adj
adj
t
tt
t
t
PE
DA P
n
   
  
 
 
Availability of monthly data for debt book values and number of shares outstanding limits the 
computation of market-oriented Z-scores. Therefore, our calculations assume constant figures 
during the year. During the financial crisis, historical data led to deep negative estimated an-
nual returns on assets. In these cases Z-scores became negative, so that a log-transformation 
was impossible. Hence, we calculated zM based on monthly data. 
 
Probability of default as an alternative measure of risk is derived from Merton’s (1974) debt 
pricing model. According to the basic form of this model, a company defaults if the value of 
its assets ( ) is less than the face value of a zero bond (D) on debt maturity date (T) – repre-
senting the entire liabilities of the regarded company. Under the assumption that the value of 
assets follows a geometric Brownian motion and applying Ito’s Lemma, the probability of 
default (PD) is given by: 
TV
 
(10) 
2
0ln
2
PD Prob( ) Prob(ln ln ) N
  
     
       
  
  
 
V
V
T T
V
V T
D
V D V D
T
 
 
where a one-year period for the time to maturity is used in our calculations.15 Market value of 
assets (V0) and volatility of assets (V) are estimated by simultaneously solving equations for 
equity value and asset volatility:16 
 
(11) 0 1 2
0 1
1N( ) N( ) and
N( )
         fr T V
EE V d D e d
V d
 
                                                 
15  This simplification can be justified by large portions of demand deposits and savings on the liabilities side 
of banks, which are payable on a daily basis or on short-term notice. Therefore, these deposits compensate 
long-term deposits. Our assumptions corresponds to the common default forecasting horizon of one year; 
see, e.g., Bharath/Shumway (2008). 
 13
16  For this approach see, e.g., Bharath/Shumway (2008). 
 where  d1 = 
2
0ln
2
       
   
 
V
f
V
V r T
D
T
 
d2 = 1  Vd T  
 
One-year Euribor is used as a proxy for the risk-free return ( ) and fr   denotes stock price 
volatility. The face value of debt is approximated by its book value. The expected return on 
assets V  is determined using the leverage formula:
17 
 
(12)  	
1
 
        

E D
E V V D V
Dr rD Er r DE
E
 
 
Cost of equity (rE) is calculated applying the CAPM. Cost of debt (rD) is determined as inter-
est expenses divided by total interest bearing debt. 
 
Loan loss provisions divided by total loans are used as an additional measure of credit risk. 
These provisions reflect expected future losses, which occur due to default risk in the lending 
business. The value of this position is generally determined as the difference between the car-
rying value (book value) of an asset and the present value of the expected future repayments 
from the borrower. Estimation of payment failure can be based on historical loss experience, 
solvency of debtor or industry, and market development. Latitude in the estimation of future 
credit risk allows banks to manipulate loan loss provisions. Therefore, realized loan losses are 
also used for a robustness check of the results. Realized losses are determined by direct loan 
write-downs and/or utilization of provisions. Here, we also take recoveries on already written-
off claims into consideration. 
 
An overview of the described performance and risk measures is presented in Table 2. These 
measures are used as dependent variables in the subsequent regression analysis. This allows 
estimation and comparison of efficiency impact on market-oriented and accounting-based 
banks’ performance and risk measures. 
                                                 
 14
17  Note that N(d2) using the notation of formula (10) represents the so-called risk-neutral PD. To receive the 
actual PD in formula (10), the corresponding distribution function hast to be shifted from mean rf to mean 
V. This is done by the help of the leverage effect to estimate V based on observable cost of equity. 
 Performance Risk 
Market-oriented 
R  Average stock return  Volatility of stock returns 
 Jensen’s alpha PD Probability of default 
q Tobin’s q zM Market-oriented Z-score 
M/B Market-to-book ratio  
Accounting-based 
RIadj Adjusted residual income over adjusted book value of equity z Accounting-based Z-score 
  LLP Loan loss provisions over total loans 
 
Table 2: Overview of performance and risk measures 
 
3. Data and Summary Statistics 
 
The empirical investigations of our paper focus on publicly traded commercial banks from 27 
European countries between 2004 and 2009. To guarantee the quality of the analysis, the re-
quired financial data was mostly hand-collected directly from the banks’ financial statements. 
To eliminate differences in accounting standards, annual financial statements reported under 
IFRS were considered. Thus, only listed banks were involved in the study, which have dis-
closed their annual reports under IFRS at least since 2005. Since the sample consists of group 
financial companies, consolidated financial statements were used. 
 
Market information was taken from the Bankscope database. Missing stock prices were ob-
tained from the respective stock exchanges. Insufficient financial statement and market in-
formation narrowed the sample to 444 observations (74 observations per year). The data com-
prises 24 countries of the European Union plus Switzerland, Liechtenstein, and Norway. 
 
Summary statistics for performance and risk measures are reported in Table 3. The financial 
crisis between 2007 and 2008 is associated with performance deterioration, where a sharp 
decline in performance was observed in 2008. In the year 2009, banks on average show in-
creasing performance compared to the previous year. Annual return and Tobin’s q reflect a 
positive trend between 2004 and 2006. Taking cost of capital into consideration, residual in-
come and Jensen’s alpha showed performance reductions already in 2006. 
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Volatility shows an increasing trend over the sample period. Probability of default also in-
creases during the period of examination. Z-scores, however, reflect higher risk during the 
years 2007 and 2008, but risk decreases in 2009 according to this measure. Increased risk dur-
ing the crisis, displayed by the market-oriented Z-score, is much higher then reported by the 
accounting-oriented Z-score. 
 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
R  0.17 0.26 0.28 0.07 0.52 0.67 
 0.11 0.20 0.19 0.15 0.59 0.62 
q 1.07 1.09 1.16 1.14 1.00 1.01 
M
ar
ke
t-o
rie
nt
ed
 
M/B 2.05 2.31 2.87 2.62 0.96 1.13 
Pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 
A
cc
.-
ba
se
d 
RIadj  0.09 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.08 
 0.17 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.44 0.63 
PD [%] 0.01 0.09 0.11 2.36 3.93 7.24 
M
ar
ke
t-
or
ie
nt
ed
 
zM 28.44 25.63 18.43 17.85 10.06 10.69 
z 26.16 26.35 25.89 25.38 23.53 27.66 
R
is
k 
A
cc
ou
nt
in
g-
ba
se
d 
LLP 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 
 
Table 3: Cross-sectional average performance and risk figures for the period 2004–2009 
 
In the following, we analyze the influence of efficiency on risk and performance of banks. 
Therefore, cost, revenue and profit efficiency (CE, RE, and PE) are dependent variables in the 
analysis. To assess the drivers of banks’ performance and risk, corresponding measures are 
regressed on overall efficiencies and their components. Cost efficiency (CE) is decomposed 
into technical efficiency (TE) and input-oriented allocative efficiency (IAE). The former con-
sists of input-oriented pure technical efficiency (IPTE) and input-oriented scale efficiency 
(ISE). Similarly, revenue efficiency (RE) is decomposed into output-oriented allocative effi-
ciency (OAE), output-oriented pure technical efficiency (OPTE), and output-oriented scale 
efficiency (OSE). Overall efficiencies and their components applied in this study are summa-
rized in Figure 1. 
 16
 CE (cost efficiency) = TE  IAE
RE (revenue efficiency) = TE  OAE
PE (profit efficiency)
MI (Malmquist index) = TEC  TC
TE (technical efficiency) = ISE  IPTE
TE (technical efficiency) = OSE  OPTE
IAE (input-oriented allocative efficiency)
OAE (output-oriented allocative efficiency)
ISE (input-oriented scale efficiency)
OSE (output-oriented scale efficiency)
IPTE (input-oriented pure technical efficiency)
OPTE (output-oriented pure technical efficiency)
TEC (technical efficiency change) = SEC  PTEC
(I/O)SEC (input/output-oriented scale efficiency change)
(I/O)PTEC (input/output-oriented pure technical efficiency change)
TC (technological change)
 
 
Figure 1: Overview of efficiency terms and efficiency change measures18 
 
Cross-sectional average values of efficiency scores according to the production and interme-
diation models are presented in Tables 4 and 5, respectively. The production model (see Table 
4) shows that the analyzed European banks experienced a decreasing trend in cost, revenue 
and profit efficiency from 2004 to 2008. The intermediation model (see Table 5) shows dif-
ferent results. Here, efficiency scores decreased gradually in 2005 and subsequently increased 
before falling back by the end of the observation period. 
 
                                                 
 17
18  For the decomposition of efficiency measures see Cooper/Seiford/Tone (2007), pp. 258–272; for the de-
composition of the Malmqist index in the DEA framework see Färe et al. (1992) and Färe et al. (1994). 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
CE 0.62 0.59 0.58 0.50 0.39 0.53 
     TE 0.84 0.81 0.78 0.76 0.74 0.76 
          ISE 0.94 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.87 0.89 
          IPTE 0.89 0.88 0.85 0.83 0.85 0.87 
     IAE 0.73 0.72 0.75 0.66 0.53 0.70 
RE 0.75 0.71 0.65 0.59 0.55 0.61 
          OSE 0.93 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.86 0.87 
          OPTE 0.90 0.90 0.86 0.84 0.86 0.88 
     OAE 0.88 0.86 0.82 0.76 0.73 0.78 
Ef
fic
ie
nc
y 
PE 0.68 0.64 0.58 0.54 0.47 0.52 
 
Table 4: Cross-sectional averages of cost, revenue and profit efficiency (CE, RE, and 
PE) and their components in the production approach 
 
 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
CE 0.79 0.76 0.78 0.81 0.79 0.74 
     TE 0.93 0.90 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.91 
          ISE 0.97 0.94 0.97 0.97 0.95 0.93 
          IPTE 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.98 0.98 
     IAE 0.85 0.84 0.85 0.87 0.86 0.82 
RE 0.83 0.81 0.81 0.82 0.80 0.78 
          OSE 0.96 0.94 0.96 0.97 0.95 0.93 
          OPTE 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.98 0.98 
     OAE 0.89 0.89 0.87 0.88 0.87 0.86 
Ef
fic
ie
nc
y 
PE 0.78 0.69 0.70 0.72 0.74 0.71 
Table 5: Cross-sectional averages of cost, revenue and profit efficiency (CE, RE, and 
PE) and their components in the intermediation approach 
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The Malmquist index generally compares technologies between periods. In the DEA frame-
work, it can be used to analyze sources of productivity changes over time. According to the 
Färe/Grosskopf/Lindgren/Roos (1992) decomposition, the Malmquist index breaks down into 
efficiency change (EC) and technological change (TC). EC measures the change in technical 
efficiency of banks between two periods. TC measures technological improvement between 
two periods, i.e. a shift in the efficient frontier. Regarding the Färe/Grosskopf/Norris/Zhang 
(1994) decomposition, pure technical efficiency change and scale efficiency change can be 
input- (IPTEC, ISEC) or output-oriented (OPTEC, OSEC).19 Pure technical efficiency change 
measures the managerial effort between two periods. Scale efficiency change reflects scale 
improvement between two periods. The input or output orientation of efficiency change cal-
culation does not influence the Malmquist index. The corresponding cross-sectional results 
for the production and the intermediation approach are summarized in Tables 6 and 7, respec-
tively. 
 
Years 20042005 20052006 20062007 20072008 20082009 
MI 0.988 0.967 1.022 1.005 0.968 
     TEC 0.971 0.964 0.969 0.983 1.054 
          ISEC 0.980 1.005 0.989 0.948 1.029 
          IPTEC 0.993 0.965 0.981 1.037 1.025 
          OSEC 0.976 1.014 0.990 0.945 1.030 
          OPTEC 0.995 0.955 0.980 1.043 1.026 E
ff
ic
ie
nc
y 
ch
an
ge
 
     TC 1.016 1.004 1.062 1.027 0.927 
 
Table 6: Cross-sectional averages of the Malmquist index (MI) and its components in 
the production approach 
 
 
Years 20042005 20052006 20062007 20072008 20082009 
MI 0.990 1.003 0.978 0.972 0.944 
     TEC 0.971 1.030 1.006 1.002 0.987 
          ISEC 0.975 1.030 1.005 0.977 0.978 
          IPTEC 0.997 1.000 1.002 1.027 1.009 
          OSEC 0.976 1.031 1.004 0.978 0.979 
          OPTEC 0.997 0.999 1.002 1.025 1.008 E
ff
ic
ie
nc
y 
ch
an
ge
 
     TC 1.019 0.974 0.972 0.972 0.957 
Table 7: Cross-sectional averages of the Malmquist index (MI) and its components in 
the intermediation approach 
 
Comparing efficiency scores measured by the production and the intermediation model in 
single years shows that the intermediation approach yields significantly higher efficiency 
scores (see Table 8). These results confirm the findings of Drake/Hall/Simper (2009), who 
compared, however, only pure technical efficiency scores. In case of efficiency changes, still 
 19
                                                 
19  See, again, the overview in Figure 1. 
more than half of the efficiency change measures show significantly different results (see Ta-
ble 9). Thus, the production and the intermediation model produce significantly different effi-
ciency scores for banks, especially in single year efficiency measurement.20 
 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
CE 0.072*** 0.060*** 0.082*** 0.105*** 0.093*** 0.081***
     TE 0.088*** 0.076*** 0.119*** 0.156*** 0.162*** 0.127***
          ISE 0.098*** 0.113*** 0.078*** 0.166*** 0.278*** 0.118***
          IPTE 0.146*** 0.153*** 0.157*** 0.261*** 0.343*** 0.199***
     IAE 0.021** 0.023** 0.043*** 0.060*** 0.079*** 0.051***
RE 0.061*** 0.048*** 0.076*** 0.099*** 0.086*** 0.073***
          OSE 0.020** 0.037*** 0.059*** 0.121*** 0.139*** 0.083***
          OPTE 0.088*** 0.090*** 0.147*** 0.225*** 0.241*** 0.171***
     OAE 0.035*** 0.038*** 0.053*** 0.069*** 0.090*** 0.064***
Ef
fic
ie
nc
y 
PE 0.078*** 0.043 0.073 0.141*** 0.226*** 0.191***
 
Table 8: Average differences of efficiency scores based on the production model and 
the intermediation model (***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1 %, 5 % 
and 10 % level, resp.) 
 
 
Years 20042005 20052006 20062007 20072008 20082009 
MI 0.018 0.010 0.039*** 0.052*** 0.030***
     TEC 0.016 0.051*** 0.048*** 0.001 0.054***
          ISEC 0.020 0.025** 0.027*** 0.026* 0.017 
          IPTEC 0.003 0.061 0.099*** 0.055*** 0.071***
          OSEC 0.019 0.034*** 0.027*** 0.029*** 0.021 
          OPTEC 0.002 0.021* 0.021*** 0.024** 0.037***E
ff
ic
ie
nc
y 
ch
an
ge
 
     TC 0.005 0.012 0.020*** 0.025** 0.035***
Table 9: Average differences of efficiency change scores based on the production model 
and the intermediation model (denotation of significance according to Table 8) 
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20  Note, that higher efficiency scores do not necessarily support superiority of the intermediation model. For 
example, the intermediation model efficiency scores from Table 5 apparently do not reflect the slump of the 
financial crisis. Instead, the quality of the model can be evaluated based on its explanatory power; see Sec-
tion 4 on this. 
The following section presents the results regarding the question, which components of effi-
ciency drive market-oriented performance, shareholder value created, and risk level of banks. 
In addition, the explanatory power of the two models will be compared. 
 
4. Regression Analysis 
 
In order to evaluate how efficiency drives performance and risk of European listed banks, the 
following general regression equations are formulated:
 
 21
,
,
(13) , 0 1 , , 1
, 0 1 , , 1
Performance Efficiency Change
Risk Efficiency Change


 
 
   
 
 
   
i t i t t i t
i t i t t i t
 
The regression analysis consists of cross-sectional and time-series observations, where sub-
script i denotes single banks (i = 1,…,74), and t stands for year 2005,…,2009. The residual  
represents the idiosyncratic error term. In order to take not only current year efficiency into 
consideration, but also efficiency of the previous year, lagged efficiency variable can be in-
cluded in the regression. Due to high correlation of efficiency scores of two consecutive 
years, the percentage change of efficiency between two years (denoted by  in the tables) is 
considered as dependent variable in the following. 
 
Since panel data regression is applied, the Hausman (1978) test was run to test the hypothesis 
of no correlation between unobserved heterogeneity and the regressors. Since the hypothesis 
could not be rejected, the generalized least square random effect (GLS RE) technique is 
used – controlling for existing scale heteroscedasticity across panels and serial correlation 
within panels. 
The regression results of the performance analysis, applying the production model, are pre-
sented in Table 10. The overall R-squared indicates that cost efficiency possesses the highest 
influence on purely market-oriented performance of banks. Stock return and Jensen’s alpha 
are explained by cost efficiency to 16.39 % and 16.68 %, respectively. Within cost efficiency, 
both input-oriented allocative and technical efficiency play an important role for purely mar-
ket-oriented performance. Though, only scale efficiency, as a component of technical effi-
ciency, influences stock return and Jensen’s alpha. Revenue efficiency is also significant here, 
but with low explanatory power (3.52 % for stock return and 3.77 % for Jensen’s alpha). 
 22
                                                
Within revenue efficiency, again, only scale and allocative efficiency play a significant posi-
tive role. Interestingly – where the overall R-squared exceeds one percent –, input-oriented 
efficiency measures show higher overall coefficients of determination compared to output-
oriented ones. Pure technical efficiency is insignificant for stock return and Jensen’s alpha. 
However, it negatively influences Tobin’s q and market-to-book ratio. Accounting-based 
shareholder value measured by residual income is only affected by profit efficiency. Techno-
logical change turns out to be insignificant for all performance measures. 
 
The intermediation approach shows, in general, a considerably lower explanatory power to 
bank performance compared to the production model (see Table 11). Only few overall effi-
ciencies or efficiency components are significant. Again, pure technical efficiency negatively 
influences Tobin’s q and market-to-book ratio. At the same time, input-oriented allocative 
efficiency boosts these performance measures. 
 
The applied GLS RE technique ignores a possible correlation between panels. But the Pesaran 
(2004) test confirms cross-panel correlation. In order to combine heteroscedastic error terms 
across panels and correlated error terms within and across panels, feasible generalized least 
squares (FGLS) technique and panel-corrected standard error (PCSE) linear regression can be 
used for estimation. In case the number of periods is less than the number of panels (banks), 
the FGLS estimation can lead to invalid results.21 Therefore, PCSE estimation was applied to 
check the results obtained with GLS RE regression.22 Direction and significance of efficiency 
influence on performance almost mirror our GLS RE findings of both the production and the 
intermediation model. 
 
Summarizing the obtained results, the production approach superiorly explains performance 
of banks compared to the intermediation model. From this perspective, capital market partici-
pants view banks as production units considering deposits as important part of their operating 
activities. Cost efficiency, compared to revenue efficiency, exhibits the strongest influence on 
market-oriented performance of banks in our sample. Profit efficiency does not possess, how-
ever, a strong effect on performance. Assessing the main components of cost and revenue 
efficiency indicates that scale and allocative efficiency drive the performance of banks. Pure 
technical efficiency shows either no effect or negative influence on performance. 
 
21  See Beck/Katz (1995). 
22  Results are not reported in this paper but are available from the authors upon request. 
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Analyzing the influence of efficiency on risk of banks (second equation of formulas (13)), the 
same statistical tests and regression techniques were run, that were applied in performance 
analysis. The results of the production model are reported in Table 12. The figures show that 
pure technical efficiency increases volatility of stock returns and probability of default. It re-
duces distance to default measured by Z-scores. These findings indicate that improvements in 
pure technical efficiency are accompanied by higher risk taking of banks. 
 
Table 12 also contains unexpected results concerning allocative efficiency. Input-oriented 
allocative efficiency shows a positive impact on volatility and a negative impact on the mar-
ket-oriented Z-score. Additionally, it positively influences loan loss provisions. However, 
after controlling for cross-panel correlation, significance of allocative efficiency influence on 
the mention risk measures disappears in PCSE regression. 
 
The intermediation approach possesses higher explanatory power of technical efficiency 
(components) for stock volatility and probability of default (see Table 13). Again, there is a 
positive relation between market-oriented risk and pure technical efficiency. However, alloca-
tive efficiency and technological change drive market-oriented risk reduction. These results 
imply that the ability to efficiently manage input quantities and outputs levels is related to 
higher asset volatility, which in turn is reflected in higher equity volatility. The latter causes a 
reduction in stock prices, which can be recognized looking at Tobin’s q and market-to-book 
value (see Tables 10 and 11). This negative effect is, however, compensated by scale and al-
locative efficiency in case of purely market-oriented performance measures. 
 
Controlling for cross-panel correlation, loan loss provisions decrease with increasing pure 
technical efficiency. Additionally, to exclude income smoothing of banks, we replaced loan 
loss provisions by realized loan losses in terms of direct write-downs on loans and/or utiliza-
tion of corresponding provisions. The corresponding results show no evidence that pure tech-
nical efficiency reduces write-downs on loans. 
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In order to check the robustness of the achieved results, several macroeconomic and bank-
specific control variables were included in the regression. We control for assets size (natural 
logarithm of assets), financial structure (leverage), and profitability of banks (return on eq-
uity). Income diversification is taken into account by the ratio of non-interest income over net 
operating income. Macroeconomic variables include (logarithm of) real GDP per capita and 
inflation rate of the corresponding country. Conditioning on these additional bank and macro-
economic characteristics, the described results stay robust. 
 
Purely market-oriented performance is still positively affected by input-oriented scale and 
allocative efficiency. Increasing pure technical efficiency causes higher asset volatility and, 
hence, increasing stock volatility. With respect to shareholder value determined by adjusted 
residual income, results differ from our other performance findings. Here, output-oriented 
pure technical and allocative efficiency influence accounting-based shareholder value in a 
positive way. This indicates that the managers’ ability to improve pure technical efficiency is 
reflected in superior accounting figures (residual income and contrariwise loan loss provi-
sions). In contrast, purely market-oriented performance is not driven by pure technical effi-
ciency. 
 
If loan loss provisions are replaced by realized loan losses, the significant influence of pure 
technical efficiency disappears. This, once more, supports our finding, that pure technical 
efficiency is improved accompanied by higher asset risk. The latter does not occur in account-
ing figures, but is incorporated in stock prices in terms of Tobin’s q and market-to-book ratio. 
With regard to stock return and Jensen’s alpha, this effect interferes with scale efficiency. The 
main robustness check results are summarized in Table 14, where according to the direction, 
only significant results are denoted by plus or minus sign. 
 
  
 
Performance Risk 
Market- 
oriented 
Acc.-
based 
Market-
oriented 
Accounting- 
based 
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     TC        +    
Table 14: Robustness check results with respect to macroeconomic and industry-specific 
variables (+ and  indicate significance with positive and negative influence, 
resp.; production model results for performance measures, intermediation 
model results for risk measures; RLL denotes realized loan losses over total 
loans) 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
We analyzed the relation between efficiency on the one hand and performance and risk on the 
other hand of European listed banks. Decomposition of overall efficiencies into their compo-
nents allows a detailed analysis of performance and risk drivers of the European commercial 
banking industry in the period between 2004 and 2009. To guarantee the quality of the analy-
sis, all accounting data was hand-collected from annual reports under IFRS. Market-oriented 
and accounting-based measures were used as dependent variables in the regression analysis to 
capture all possible influencing factors of efficiency on performance and risk of banks. 
 
The impact of postulating the production or the intermediation model was also examined. 
Comparing efficiency scores shows that the intermediation model yields significantly higher 
figures compared to the production approach. Assessing the influence of efficiency on per-
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 formance and risk of banks, we found, however, evidence for superiority of the production 
model in explaining performance. Contrariwise, the intermediation model seems to superiorly 
predict risk. Market-oriented performance is mostly affected by cost efficiency. Allocative 
and scale efficiency are the main drivers for performance of banks. These results demonstrate 
that abilities to choose the right operating size and to manage competitive input and output 
prices lead to superior performance in the banking industry. 
 
As a further important finding, our sample shows that pure technical efficiency is associated 
with higher asset risk. Higher asset risk is reflected in higher stock volatility and, hence, 
causes lower market values. This implies that bank managers can improve pure technical effi-
ciency by taking more risk. This form of higher risk is not captured by accounting figures, but 
priced by the capital market. Due to this effect of indicating seemingly lower credit risk, ac-
counting-based residual income increases and loan loss provisions decrease with higher pure 
technical efficiency. 
 
In contrast to previous studies, we also applied realized loan losses as risk measure, calculated 
by direct write-downs and utilization of loan loss provisions. Realized loan losses are not af-
fected by pure technical efficiency. This, again, implies that managers are able to influence 
accounting information in this respect, whereas the capital market incorporates this circum-
stance. Table 15 summarizes the main results of our paper. 
 
 
Intermediation vs. 
production approach 
 Intermediation model shows higher efficiency scores 
 Production model superiorly explains performance 
 Intermediation model superiorly explains risk 
Scale efficiency  Improvement in market-oriented performance 
Allocative efficiency  Improvements in market-oriented performance 
 Risk reduction 
Pure technical efficiency 
 Market value reduction 
 Increase in risk 
 Accounting-based measures show opposite results 
Technological change  Risk reduction 
Scale efficiency change  Improvement in market-oriented performance 
Pure technical 
efficiency change 
 Market value reduction 
 Increase in risk 
Table 15: Summary of main results 
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 Appendix
 
There are many possible adjustments that can be applied for accounting components of EVA. 
The adopted adjustments shall eliminate accounting distortions and lead to improvements in 
explaining market values. Industry specifics and different reporting standards must be taken 
into consideration in the set of adjustments. Uyemura/Kantor/Pettit (1996) present common 
bank-specific adjustments, that affect loan loss provisions, deferred taxes, non-recurring 
events (e.g. restructuring charges), and securities accounting. Fiordelisi (2007) and Fiorde-
lisi/Molyneux (2010a) capitalize also research and development (R&D) costs and operating 
lease payments. 
 
Latitude in estimating future credit risk allows banks to manipulate loan loss provisions for 
income smoothing purposes. In order to avoid possible distortions from income smoothing of 
listed European banks, only incurred losses during the year in form of utilization of provisions 
and/or direct write-downs through profit and loss are considered. This important information, 
interestingly, has not been disclosed by many publicly-traded European banks during the ob-
servation years. This lack of financial information has sharply narrowed the sample of banks, 
limiting the analysis to 74 banks. Deferred taxes, as non-current cash cost, establish a kind of 
provisions for possible future cash payments, what can distort actual realized returns on in-
vested capital. Therefore, calculating residual income, only current tax payments are taken 
into consideration. Calculating residual income, net income and equity book values are ad-
justed by loan loss provisions and deferred taxes as follows: 
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Since from an external point of view, it is difficult to distinguish between investment and dis-
investment character of restructuring activities, restructuring charges are not taken into con-
sideration. Securities accounting adjustment is also ignored, since trading is one of the core 
activities of banks leading to better or worse performance in the reporting year. Adoption of 
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IAS 36 eliminates the reason for goodwill adjustment. Concerning R&D, production costs for 
in-house development of software were already capitalized according to IAS 38. No other 
development costs were recognized or disclosed in net income statements. Leasing payments 
only influence net income in equity valuation frameworks. Net income must be adjusted by 
adding lease payments and subtracting amortization amounts. Assuming equality of both 
amounts leads to unaffected net income. 
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